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JUDICIAL WAIVER AS THE ONLY EQUITABLE
METHOD TO TRANSFER JUVENILE OFFENDERS
TO CRIMINAL COURT
WILLIAM HANNAN*
INTRODUCTION
The notion of a juvenile offender being "tried as an adult"
has become commonplace in our society due to its frequent
mention in newspaper articles and on the evening news. It is gen-
erally understood that a child who has committed a serious crime
can be tried as an adult in standard criminal court, as opposed to
being subject to adjudication in a juvenile court. At first glance
this seems like a sound policy: if a minor has committed a serious
violent crime, then he should lose all the benefits of his juvenile
status and be subject to harsher punishment in the criminal jus-
tice system. The rationale is that dangerous child offenders need
to be kept off the streets in the interest of public safety, just like
their adult counterparts. But what happens when a troubled
youth is not given the benefit of the doubt by the society that has
failed him and instead is locked up in jail with hardened
criminals, effectively foreclosing all hope of rehabilitation? For a
while, perhaps the streets are safe from this child offender, but
what happens years later when inevitably he is released from a
prison system that has consistently failed as a rehabilitative enter-
prise? An over-inclusive waiver policy fails to benefit society and
juvenile offenders, who desperately need help to get on the right
track. A close examination reveals that waiver of juvenile court
jurisdiction over a young offender has serious legal, societal, and
policy effects. Much of the debate surrounding waiver centers
around important procedural considerations, namely who-and
under what circumstances-determines when it is "appropriate
to treat the subjects of the juvenile justice system charged with
serious offenses as if they were adults and banish them to prison
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2008; B.A., University of Cali-
fornia, Los Angeles, 2004. Many thanks to all the members of the Notre Dame
Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy for their helpful comments and editorial
suggestions throughout the publication process. I'd also like to thank my fam-
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for long terms? To put the matter less charitably: When are
juveniles not juveniles?"1
The juvenile justice system has gone through major changes
and reforms in the past three decades, and it currently maintains
a delicate balance between the original aim of rehabilitation and
the more recent policies of retribution and punishment. The sys-
tem transitioned from one primarily dedicated to the best inter-
ests of the child to one where the interest in public safety has
become a major consideration, if not the primary consideration. 2
This shift in policy parallels the increased use of legislative and
prosecutorial waivers, instead of the traditional judicial discre-
tionary waiver, as a reaction to public outcry against an upsurge
in youth violence.
The increase in transfer to criminal court and the transfor-
mation of the juvenile court into a "mini criminal court" raises
"grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults
nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for
children."'
It is obvious that transfer is necessary in some cases. Some
juveniles, because of the heinousness of their acts or a prior
record full of violent crimes, are not amenable to any sort of
treatment available via the juvenile justice system and must be
transferred to criminal court so they can receive-for incapacita-
tion and punitive purposes-the harsh punishment they deserve.
These transfers should be relatively rare, however, and the cur-
rent policy regarding waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction is too
broad to serve any effective purpose for the juvenile or society.
This Note argues that the increased use of over-inclusive leg-
islative and prosecutorial waivers is a mere "quick-fix" to the juve-
nile crime problem and serves neither the interests of society at
large nor the juvenile population. The solution to this problem is
a reinvigorated focus on the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile
justice system and the use of judicial discretion for waiver only in
the most severe cases, evaluated on an individualized case-by-case
basis. Children are legally, developmentally, and psychologically
distinct from adults, and these differences necessitate a focus on
rehabilitation and treatment in the majority of cases. Though
1. Franklin E. Zimring, The Treatment of Hard Cases in American Juvenile
Justice: In Defense of Discretionary Waiver, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
267, 267 (1991).
2. Eric K. Klein, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of
Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371, 373-74
(1998).
3. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
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many violent and repeat juvenile offenders leave society no
choice but to transfer them into the criminal system and treat
them as adults, this Note argues additionally that judicial
waiver-though in need of reform itself-is the only way to make
this crucial determination in a way that does not run converse to
the goals of the juvenile system and to the good of society.4
Section I of this Note discusses the development of the
American juvenile justice system by looking at the aims of its
founders and how a series of Supreme Court decisions has
affected the operation and aims of the juvenile courts. Section II
analyzes the three types of waiver-judicial, legislative, and
prosecutorial-and concludes that the judicial discretion associ-
ated with traditional waiver is the only method that can satisfy the
interests of the child and society. Section III examines develop-
mental and psychological issues regarding juveniles, and when
combined with the jurisprudence of juvenile law, shows why
juveniles are considered "different" from adults and must be
adjudged in a system that has their best interests in mind. Finally,
Section IV offers suggestions to improve judicial waiver for the
benefit of youths and society.
I. DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. The Origins of the Juvenile Justice System
The first juvenile court in the United States was created in
1899 by the Illinois state legislature in Cook County with the mis-
sion of "guid[ing] juvenile delinquents toward responsible and
productive adulthood, not punish[ing] them."5 The Illinois
model spread quickly, and by 1930, every state except one had a
juvenile court authorized by the state legislature in place;6 by the
end of Word War II, every state had established a separate court
system forjuveniles.7 The philosophy of the juvenile court system
descended from the notion of parens patriae, an English concept
whereby the sovereign's role was that of the "ultimate protector
of children."' In the English example, the king could become
4. This Note assumes that reasonable persons would support the aims of
the juvenile justice system-namely, rehabilitation and treatment of young
offenders.
5. JAMES C. HOWELL, JUVENILE JUSTICE & YOUTH VIOLENCE 13 (1997).
6. Id.
7. Melissa A. Scott, The "Critically Important" Decision of Waiving Juvenile
Court Jurisdiction: Who Should Decide, 50 Loy. L. REV. 711, 716 (2004).
8. Mary M. Prescott, Another Option for Older, Nonviolent Juveniles: Statutory
Retention ofJuvenile Court Jurisdiction Past the Age of Majority, 85 IowA L. REV. 997,
1003 (2000).
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the guardian of a child and offer him whatever services the State
could provide to protect him and his interests.9 Although juve-
nile court systems varied in practice from state to state,1 ° they all
had similar aims. The focus of the juvenile courts was on the
offender rather than the offense. 1
The judge played the most important official role in the
juvenile court. One commentator makes the analogy of the juve-
nile courtjudge as a father to the delinquent child, with his func-
tion being to "determine the needs of the child" and then to
"give sound advice to correct the child.1 2 A judge had wide dis-
cretion in dealing with ajuvenile delinquent; among the options
were to place the child on probation, to institutionalize him, or
to place him in a foster home or orphanage. 13 Most important to
the proponents of the juvenile system was that the creation of a
juvenile system infrastructure "reversed a 100-year tradition in
the United States of handling juvenile offenders in criminal
courts,"1 4 and detaining them in adult prisons with adult
criminals.' 5 The prevailing theme that existed throughout all the
juvenile justice systems in the United States was that the court
existed for the benefit of the child. The system and its goals were
animated by several fundamental beliefs. First, juvenile offenders
had less culpability than adult offenders. Second, because juve-
nile offenders were less guilty and more likely to be amenable to
rehabilitation, they deserved to be treated differently for their
crimes. Third, the system was designed to protect children from
the stigmatization of having a criminal record and to protect
them from the corrupting influence of being imprisoned with
adults.16 These tenets supported the philosophy of rehabilitation
rather than retribution for juvenile offenders. Clearly, the juve-
nile justice system was designed with the best interests of the
child in mind.' 7
9. MARY CLEMENT, THEJUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: LAW AND PROCESS 18 (2d
ed. 2002). In practice, this meant that a court of equity could use the power of
the sovereign to guard the child and whatever property he may have. Id.
10. See Prescott, supra note 8, at 1004 ("There is no uniform juvenile
court; individual state legislatures use their own discretion in constructing juve-
nile court systems to best serve the needs of their jurisdiction.").
11. Stacey Sabo, Rights of Passage: An Analysis of Waiver of Juvenile Court
Jurisdiction, 64 Foirmtam L. REv. 2425, 2430 (1996).
12. CLEMENT, supra note 9, at 18.
13. HOWELL, supra note 5, at 14.
14. Id.
15. CLEMENT, supra note 9, at 14.
16. Sabo, supra note 11, at 2430-31.
17. See id. at 2431 (discussing the aim of the juvenile courts to help and
protect the child, rather than punish him).
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The juvenile justice courts were very distinct from adult
criminal courts during their early history. To start with, the pro-
ceedings in juvenile court were technically civil in nature, rather
than criminal.' 8 This allowed for the use of informal procedures
and broad discretion by the judge during adjudication; most
importantly, the proceedings took place behind closed doors and
were not open to the public. This meant that no record was kept,
guaranteeing privacy for the youth. 9 These special procedures
helped to encourage rehabilitation through personalized justice.
Without all the formalities of a criminal trial, a judge could truly
evaluate a child based on the child's own set of circumstances-
including his background, age, history of delinquency, and other
relevant considerations-without focusing on the offense the
juvenile had committed.20 Standard procedural safeguards were
presumed to be unnecessary because the juvenile court's goal
was to "help and protect children, not to punish them."2
A rehabilitation program is much more likely to be success-
ful if it is tailored to a specific person based on his individual
needs. Hypothetically, the lack of a need for trial, unbendable
court rules, attorneys, and other formalities normally required
for criminal court adjudication would allow the judge to get to
the heart of the matter in analyzing a child's situation and the
context in which he committed the offense. This grant of total
access would make it easier to determine whether a child was
amenable to rehabilitation and to make a personalized recom-
mendation accordingly. Although it would seem to run counter
to the unbridled idealism of the founding years of the juvenile
justice system, the possibility of transfer to the adult system has
existed since the advent of the youth court.2 2 This option, while
always available to ajudge, was used very infrequently in the early
days of the juvenile court and was reserved for the most serious
offenders-typically older teenagers who had long prior
records.
23
Although designed to fit into a system where children were
handled as individuals, the informality of the juvenile system and
18. Klein, supra note 2, at 376-77.
19. CLEMENT, supra note 9, at 19. Juvenile courts even developed a differ-
ent vocabulary from criminal courts that reflected its rehabilitative goals. For
example, "Police did not 'arrest' children; they 'took them into custody.' Judges
did not have a 'trial' for the youth; they held an 'adjudicatory hearing.' The
judges did not 'sentence' the youth; they gave a 'disposition."' Id. at 19.
20. See Sabo, supra note 11, at 2430 (setting forth the original basis for
evaluating a juvenile offender).
21. Id. at 2431.
22. Klein, supra note 2, at 377.
23. Id.
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its lack of procedural safeguards began to raise some startling
constitutional questions regarding due process, especially as the
volume of cases in the juvenile court increased and judges
devoted less time to each juvenile who came before them.24 In
time, "because of the lack of procedural protections, children
accused of crimes or even status offenses were often being arbi-
trarily and unfairly punished."25 The Supreme Court confronted
these issues in a string of cases beginning in the mid-1960s.
These decisions had a significant impact in transforming an insti-
tution focused on individual treatment and rehabilitation into a
system which more closely resembled a miniature criminal
court.
2 6
B. Constitutional Changes to the Juvenile Justice System
The landmark case in the transfer of juveniles to criminal
court is Kent v. United States.27 Morris Kent was sixteen years old
and already on probation when he was arrested on suspicion of
breaking into a woman's house, robbing her, and raping her.28
The government sought a waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction so
that Kent could be tried in criminal court. The juvenile court
judge failed to respond to requests by Kent's lawyer for a hearing
and for access to Kent's social file. 29 The judge entered an order
waiving juvenile court jurisdiction over Kent but did not offer any
reason or justification for his decision; he wrote that the decision
had been made after a "full investigation," ° despite the fact that
he had made no findings. Upon review, the United States
Supreme Court held that a child who is facing "the critically
important" action of transfer is "entitled to a hearing, including
access by his counsel to the social records and probation or simi-
lar reports which presumably are considered by the court, and to
a statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court's decision. '3 2 The
decision by the Court emphasized the significance of waiver in
the life of a child-in this case it could have meant the "differ-
ence between five years' confinement and a death sentence. 3
24. See generally CLEMENT, supra note 9, at 18-20 (providing an overview of
the history and treatment of offenders in the early years of the juvenile justice
system).
25. Klein, supra note 2, at 377.
26. Id.
27. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
28. Id. at 543.
29. Id. at 546.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 546-47.
32. Id. at 556-57.
33. Id. at 557.
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The decision also emphasized that the accused must have the
ability to retain effective counsel before the judge makes a mean-
ingful inquiry, taking all the relevant factors into consideration.
The Kent decision afforded juveniles basic due process rights in
order to avoid the arbitrariness of waiver decisions like the one
that Morris Kent received and that were seemingly becoming
more common as the use ofjudicial waiver increased throughout
the country. The Court commended the goals of the juvenile jus-
tice system but observed that it was worrisome to consider the
child in a state of limbo between juvenile and criminal court,
with the benefits and safeguards of neither.35
In re Gault, 6 decided the year after Kent, is the decision most
associated with the transformation of the juvenile court into a
system that looked more like a miniature criminal court. 7 Fif-
teen-year-old Gerald Gault, already on probation for a prior
offense, was arrested for making a lewd phone call. He subse-
quently went through a series of informal hearings in the juve-
nile court, was denied the assistance of counsel, and was
committed to a juvenile facility until his twenty-first birthday.38
The Supreme Court reversed the sentence and held that
juveniles were entitled to basic due process rights, including
advance notice of charges, the right to counsel, the rights to con-
frontation and cross-examination, the privilege against self-
incrimination, the right to a transcript of the proceedings, and
the right to appellate review.39 Taken together, this bundle of
procedural safeguards and due process rights make a juvenile
adjudication closely resemble a criminal trial in a substantial
number of ways. The majority opinion acknowledged that the
idealistic objectives of the juvenile justice system had largely
failed and concluded that "unbridled discretion, however benev-
olently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle
and procedure."4 The Court in Gault sought to achieve a bal-
ance of procedural safeguards and the benefits that go along
with juvenile court adjudication. Instead, finding that the juve-
nile justice system was falling short of expectations, the Court
decided that importing basic due process rights was necessary to
maintain the integrity of the courts. If the juvenile justice system
was underperforming, or even broken, it was better to leave juve-
34. Id.
35. Id. at 556.
36. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
37. Klein, supra note 2, at 379.
38. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 4-9.
39. See id.
40. Id. at 18.
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nile offenders with some basic due process rights to protect
them.
The Court tried to walk the tightrope between the juvenile
courts and the criminal courts in a string of decisions post-Gault.
Deciding In re Winship, the Court held that the "beyond a reason-
able doubt" standard was the standard of proof in a juvenile
court case, replacing the previous standard of "preponderance of
the evidence."'" The majority opinion gave no credence to the
argument that the adoption of the criminal court standard of
proof in juvenile court would "risk destruction of beneficial
aspects of the juvenile process,"4 2 but instead insisted that the
higher standard of proof was required as an essential tenet of
due process under Gault.4 3
The juvenile court system took one step closer to the crimi-
nal court system in Breed v. Jones, where the Court held that the
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited the criminal prosecution of a
juvenile offender after his case had been adjudicated previously
in juvenile court.4 4 Importing yet another protection from crimi-
nal to juvenile court, the Court noted that even if "the [uvenile]
system has fallen short of the high expectations of its sponsors [,
that] in no way detracts from the broad social benefits sought or
from those benefits that can survive constitutional scrutiny.
4 1
The Court thus acknowledged the continuing function of the
juvenile courts as a valuable and unique entity from the criminal
court and explicitly stated that not all the procedures and formal-
ities of the criminal court needed to be imported for the juvenile
court to be constitutionally viable. This line of thinking is
reflected in a couple of exceptions to Kent and its progeny, as
discussed below.
The Court has, on occasion, declined to mandate that cer-
tain requirements of criminal court be applied to juvenile court
as well. These decisions demonstrate that the Court, although
concerned with procedural safeguards, recognizes the inherent
value of having a separate apparatus to deal with youth offenders.
For example, a plurality in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania held that jury
trials were not constitutionally required in the adjudicative stage
of juvenile court proceedings. 46 The opinion written by Justice
Harlan once again acknowledges the many failings of the juve-
41. In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
42. Id. at 366.
43. Id. at 367.
44. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 527-29 (1975).
45. Id. at 529.
46. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (plurality
opinion).
JUDICIAL WAIVER AS THE ONLY EQUITABLE METHOD
nile justice system, but again seems to hold out hope for
improvements. A large part of his reasoning seems to be based
on the fact that mandating jury trials would convert the juvenile
court into a true adversarial criminal court forjuvenile offenders;
the Court's unwillingness to take this step demonstrates its belief
that the system is not fundamentally flawed, but is plagued by
inadequate judges and lack of resources.47 Later, in Schall v. Mar-
tin, the Court held that there was no right to bail in juvenile adju-
dications and that a judge may authorize pretrial detention
under certain circumstances.48
The influential string of decisions by the Supreme Court
regarding the juvenile justice system displays a willingness to pro-
vide the most essential procedural safeguards to minors in juve-
nile court; at the same time, the Court makes it very clear that,
although the system has failed to meet expectations, it should be
preserved and protected and remain distinct from the criminal
court. The importation of basic procedural safeguards made the
juvenile justice system look more and more like a miniature crim-
inal court. These new procedural requirements, combined with
an increase in juvenile crime and legislative changes to waiver
statutes, created an environment where 'Juvenile justice systems
around the country began shifting their emphasis from rehabili-
tation to punishment and incapacitation."49 In other words, the
focus on doing what was best for the child was practically aban-
doned, while a new philosophy of getting tough on juvenile
offenders and protecting society was adopted.5 ° The alteration in
focus from rehabilitation to criminalization in the juvenile justice
system coincided with state legislatures around the country using
their power to enact new transfer statutes that made it easier to
waive juvenile court jurisdiction; this drastically increased the
number of youth offenders being transferred to criminal court
and further exacerbated the problems in the juvenile court
system.
II. TYPES OF WAIVER
Even the most idealistic proponent of the juvenile courts
must admit that not every juvenile offender is amenable to treat-
ment and rehabilitation. Some children, based on a combination
47. See, e.g., id. at 544 ("Too often the juvenile court judge falls far short
of that stalwart, protective, and communicating figure that the system
envisaged.").
48. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 (1984).
49. Klein, supra note 2, at 382.
50. See Scott, supra note 7, at 715-20 (providing an historical overview of
the evolution of the juvenile justice system).
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of several factors, including age, background, prior record, and
the seriousness of the offense they have committed, simply do
not fit within the parameters of the juvenile justice system. 5
Waiver was created for such a situation. The term "waiver" refers
to the juvenile court giving up its original jurisdiction over the
child, and transferring the offender to the criminal system,
where he will be tried and punished as an adult.
The "get tough" movement in criminal justice was spurred
by a surge of youth violence in the 1980s and early 1990s.5 2 Most
commentators agree that the extensive media coverage of youth
violence in urban areas bordered on sensationalism during this
time, "fuel[ing] perceptions that violence committed byjuveniles
ha[d] reached epidemic proportions and that no community is
immune to random violent acts committed by young people-
especially those involving a weapon."5 3 Such extensive media cov-
erage has caused fear among the public and has led to demands
for tougher punishment for violent juvenile offenders. State leg-
islatures have responded to the public demands to get tough on
juvenile crime and try more youth offenders as adults. Propo-
nents of this punitive philosophy assume that 'juveniles tried as
adults will receive longer sentences in adult facilities, which, in
turn, will act as a greater deterrent and will provide safety to the
community."5 4 This focus on trying juveniles as adults has led to
an increase in the ease of-and the options for-transferring
kids to criminal court and has undermined the purpose of the
juvenile justice system in the process.
The drastic increase in the use of transfer and the ease with
which it is accomplished are a reflection of the changing goals of
the juvenile justice system. Within the notion of waiver itself, the
growing trend of using legislative waiver and prosecutorial waiver
rather than traditional judicial waiver further signals a significant
break with the past. This section, which presents and analyzes the
three forms of waiver, ultimately concludes that both legislative
51. See generally Zimring, supra note 1 (arguing in favor of discretionary
waiver as a method of handling the most difficult cases that threaten the mis-
sion and credibility of the juvenile court).
52. See Cynthia Conward, The Juvenile Justice System: Not Necessarily in the
Best Interests of Children, 33 NEW ENG. L. REv. 39, 46 (1998) (setting forth statis-
tics of rising youth violence during this time period).
53. Id. at 47 (quoting PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE
JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 1 (1996));
see also Kelly M. Angell, The Regressive Movement, 14 S. CAL. INTE, isc. L.J. 125,
135 (2004-2005) (citing the extensive media coverage of the Columbine High
School shooting as an example of media sensationalism generating widespread
fear even though school shootings are very rare).
54. Klein, supra note 2, at 373-74.
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and prosecutorial waiver strike against the essence of a coherent
juvenile justice policy and should be abandoned as failed experi-
ments, with an increased focus placed on reforming judicial
waiver.
A. Judicial Waiver
Judicial waiver is the only one of the three types of waiver
that naturally comports with the goal of the juvenile justice sys-
tem (namely, individualized treatment with a rehabilitative aim).
Judicial discretion is the most common form of waiver, and all
but four states use it, either as a sole means of transfer or in con-
junction with the other methods.55 As in regular juvenile court
adjudications, the judge is the key decision-maker in the waiver
process. The basic framework of the hearing must comply with
the standards espoused in Kent the judge must allow the juvenile
to be effectively represented by counsel;56 the judge must allow
the juvenile's counsel access to his social record;57 and the judge
must provide a statement of reasons for his decision if he waives
his jurisdiction over the youth." Although judges have broad dis-
cretion in applying judicial waiver, they are constrained by cer-
tain factors that, varying from state to state, must be taken into
account when evaluating the youth. Most states incorporated the
list of factors suggested in Kent into their judicial waiver statutes.
These factors can roughly be broken down into two categories:
danger to the public and amenability to treatment." The judge
is then able to weigh the interests of the child against the inter-
ests of society and determine a fair outcome.6" Typically, if the
child is in his late-teens, has committed a violent offense, has a
serious prior record, and has not been responsive to prior treat-
ment attempts, he will be waived to the criminal court. If, how-
ever, the offender is in his early-to-mid-teens, he has little to no
record, and the crime is a relatively minor offense, the offender
will be adjudicated in juvenile court and an attempt will be made
to rehabilitate him. The framework of the waiver hearing allows
juveniles to be protected by essential procedural safeguards but
also allows the judge flexibility in using his discretion to deter-
mine the best result for the child.
55. Id. at 385. The four states that do not use judicial waiver are Connecti-
cut, Nebraska, New Mexico, and New York. Id.
56. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
57. Id. at 557.
58. Id.
59. See DEAN J. CHAMPION & G. LARRY MAYS, TRANSFERRING JUVENILES TO
CRIMINAL COURTS 62-63 (1991).
60. Sabo, supra note 11, at 2453.
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The biggest advantage to judicial discretion is that it allows a
juvenile offender to receive "an individualized determination as
to which forum he should be subjected,"'" and gives him "his day
in court before the jurisdiction of the juvenile court can be ter-
minated. '6 2 If applied correctly, the procedural safeguards man-
dated by Kent, combined with the traditional flexibility of the
judge's discretion, allows the judge to work within the premise of
the juvenile justice system. The judge gets to see the youth
offender, speak to him, and ask him questions; the judge then
evaluates the offender based only on his set of circumstances, not
on others with similar backgrounds or records. This is something
that is lacking in the other types of waiver. Individual determina-
tions, assuming they are done with care, ensure that only those
children who cannot be helped by the juvenile justice system will
be transferred to adult court.6" Aside from the ability to work
towards the goal of rehabilitating juveniles, the system also pro-
vides checks on abuse of discretion by judges. Whereas the other
methods for transfer have no meaningful checks, the judicial
waiver method has several: a judge is mandated to act within a
prescribed system of evaluation at the hearing; the decision of
the judge is subject to appeal; and his statement of reasons pro-
duced during the hearing guarantees that a juvenile knows why
he is being transferred.
Critics of judicial discretionary waiver argue that it is too
lenient on violent offenders and that the decisions are arbitrary
and inconsistent. Given the fact that advocates of increased trans-
fer argue that the juvenile court is too lenient in its sentencing, it
follows only naturally that they would also argue that this leni-
ency on crime affects the judgment of juvenile court judges in
regards to waiver, so that only the most extreme cases are trans-
ferred.64 Defenders of judicial discretion argue that judges are
most adept at "selecting serious, violent, and chronic offenders
for transfer."65 As Zimring notes, "[a] well-functioning juvenile
justice system will transfer only a tiny number of very serious
offenders into the criminal courts."66
The other main criticism of judicial discretion is that results
are arbitrary and inconsistent. Arbitrariness is somewhat mini-
mized because of the presence of procedural safeguards in
61. Scott, supra note 7, at 730.
62. Id. at 728.
63. See Klein, supra note 2, at 388-89 (comparingjudicial waiver to other,
less individualized transfer devices).
64. See Scott, supra note 7, at 731.
65. HOWELL, supra note 5, at 110.
66. Zimring, supra note 1, at 280.
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waiver hearings, but concerns will remain as long as there are
justices who are not properly trained or of the proper tempera-
ment for the juvenile court.67 Inconsistent results cannot be con-
sidered a disadvantage of judicial waiver because they are "a
product of individualized determinations based on the best inter-
ests of each juvenile."68 If anything, inconsistent results can serve
as anecdotal evidence that the system is working and judges are
making individualized determinations as they should be required
to do. Judicial waiver is not perfect, but because of its flexibility
and procedural safeguards for the juvenile, it is the best option
for the necessary evil of waiver.
B. Legislative Waiver
Ifjudicial waiver is the method which most closely conforms
to the traditional philosophy of the juvenile justice system, legis-
lative waiver is the method which most directly offends that phi-
losophy. Statutory waiver begins and ends with the power of the
legislature to determine who is a juvenile for legal purposes. The
framework of these types of statutes automatically excludes some
juveniles from the original jurisdiction of the juvenile courts
based on the satisfaction of certain criteria.69 For example,
depending on a state's criteria, a fifteen-year-old who commits
aggravated assault may automatically be transferred to the crimi-
nal court with no waiver hearing of any kind. The standard crite-
ria included in automatic waiver statutes include the seriousness
of the offense (generally murder, kidnapping, rape, or aggra-
vated assault), age (one is more likely to be transferred automati-
cally if over the age of fifteen), and prior record of delinquency
(longer and more serious records tend to show that the juvenile
is not amenable to rehabilitation), vo The past two decades have
seen a major increase in the number of automatic waivers, largely
a result of legislatures continually lowering the minimum ages
for transfer while expanding the number of offenses which man-
date automatic waiver for juvenile offenders. 71
Automatic waiver is antithetical to the presumptions upon
which the juvenile justice system operates. It treats young offend-
67. See infra text accompanying notes 132-34.
68. Scott, supra note 7, at 732.
69. DEAN J. CHAMPION, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 229 (3d ed. 2001).
70. See CLEMENT, supra note 9, at 142 (noting that, in Virginia, a youth
must be fourteen years of age or older to be transferred to the adult criminal
court, and mentioning a concern for the child's responses to past treatment
efforts).
71. Joshua T. Rose, Innocence Lost: The Detrimental Effect of Automatic Waiver
Statutes on Juvenile justice, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 977, 981-82 (2003).
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ers as "types" instead of individuals. There is no waiver hearing,
so even if a juvenile is amenable to rehabilitation, or just made a
single bad choice, he will never have the opportunity to contest
his transfer before he is put into the adult criminal system. Auto-
matic waiver takes away virtually all chance for rehabilitation and
has purely punitive goals. One commentator has referred to
automatic waiver as 'justice on autopilot" for the way it arbitrarily
removes the possibility for juvenile court adjudication from juve-
nile offenders, regardless of circumstances.72 It takes away the
significant and valuable benefits ofjuvenile court adjudication in
one fell swoop, in a legislative decision that was made years or
decades before the offense was committed.
The lack of individualized determinations and the emphasis
on the offense rather than the child have resulted in legislative
waiver statutes that are over-inclusive, dragging people who ordi-
narily would belong in juvenile court into the harsh world of
criminal justice.73 It is true that the kids who are intended to be
transferred as a result of this mechanism will more than likely fall
within the parameters of the statute. But what about the kids who
have no prior record, who happened to be at the wrong place at
the wrong time, or who did some things that were uncharacteris-
tic of their normal behaviors? These are the juveniles for whom
the juvenile justice system was intended; but instead of being
rehabilitated, they will be labeled a criminal and will carry that
stigma for the rest of their lives."4 Under an automatic waiver
statute, it becomes impossible to differentiate between young
career criminals and those who have made bad decisions or are
going through a rebellious phase. Not only does it seem counter-
intuitive when dealing with youths to be overbroad and group
everyone together regardless of individual circumstances, but it
also offends the notion of fairness that the Supreme Court
emphasized as necessary in Kent.7 5
Supporters of the "get tough" philosophy argue that legisla-
tive waiver is quicker, more predictable, and more consistent
than judicial waiver.76 There is no doubt that this method is
72. Sabo, supra note 11, at 2451.
73. See Klein, supra note 2, at 373 (discussing the "quick-fix solution of
trying children as adults" and the flaws which are inherent).
74. Rose, supra note 71, at 979.
75. See Ellen Marrus & Irene Merker Rosenberg, After Roper v. Simmons:
Keeping Kids Out of Adult Court, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1151, 1181-83 (2005)
(noting both the possibility of future serious harm to the community when a
child gets a lower sentence in a juvenile court and the risk of destruction to a
child who might benefit society and live a productive life, and concluding that
we should err on the side of treating a child as a child).
76. Scott, supra note 7, at 735.
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quicker and more consistent, but certainly it is not worth the
costs in terms of what is given up in exchange. It is quicker
because it bypasses any individual determination of the youth's
amenability to treatment, and based on a number of factors,
processes him straight into the adult criminal system. How many
futures are ruined because, even though a youth might be will-
ing, he is simply unable to get the rehabilitation he wants? Legis-
lative waiver cannot be challenged absent a constitutional
violation.77 Courts have generally upheld legislative waiver provi-
sions," although some commentators have questioned the judg-
ment of the courts.79
In addition to the negative policy implications and question-
able constitutionality, automatic waiver has been an outright fail-
ure in terms of deterrence and recidivism rates. Studies show that
waiver has no value as a deterrent, and the recidivism rates are
higher for offenders who have been transferred and tried in
criminal court."0 Retribution is the only goal served, and it is
achieved at the expense of possible rehabilitation and treatment
available in the juvenile justice system."' Although these failures
are applicable to all waivers, it is especially troubling under a
method where waiver is automatic and the juvenile has no
chance to seek adjudication in the juvenile court. The question
then arises: why keep automatic waiver if it is antithetical to the
best interests of juveniles and has failed in all of its stated goals
except when viewed from a purely punitive standard? It ulti-
mately makes society no safer and may even cause harm to soci-
ety when transferred offenders are inevitably released. One
commentator has a simple answer for the persistence of legisla-
tive waiver provisions: "[S]tate legislatures will remain either
ignorant or unconcerned with the irrationality and ineffective-
ness of such provisions as long as the popularity of such legisla-
77. That is, there is no option for meaningful appeal, as there is with
judicial waiver.
78. See Marisa Slaten, Note, Juvenile Transfers to Criminal Court, 55 RUTGERS
L. REv. 821, 844-46 (2003) (discussing federal and state court challenges to
statutory waiver where the waiver has been upheld, including United States v.
Bland, 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972), and Kansas v. Sherk, 538 P.2d 1399 (Kan.
1975)).
79. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 71, at 991-95 (arguing that, absent an ame-
nability hearing, automatic waiver statutes violate due process and equal protec-
tion because the classification based on age does not have a rational
relationship with the underlying purpose of the statute).
80. See id. at 979 (comparing recidivism rates for juvenile offenders who
have been transferred to criminal court with those who remained in the juve-
nile court system).
81. See id.
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tion helps to secure re-election. '8 2 Whatever minimal benefits
that are gained through consistency and expediency in auto-
matic waiver cannot outweigh the harm done to thousands of
nonviolent youth offenders who are excluded from juvenile
court jurisdiction with no hearing because of the over-inclusive
nature of such statutes.
C. Prosecutorial Waiver
The prosecutor has a substantial role in the waiver process
no matter what method of transfer is used. Many jurisdictions
require the prosecutor to recommend a waiver, file the motion,
and make the case for the State at a waiver hearing for judicial
discretion. 3 Forjurisdictions with automatic waiver, the prosecu-
tor determines what charges to file, which can either place the
juvenile inside or outside of the confines of the statute. For
example, if a child has committed a certain crime that would
automatically exclude him from the juvenile court, the prosecu-
tor can use his discretion to charge him with a lesser violation if
he feels that exclusion is unwarranted. 4 In the third type of
waiver, the entire decision belongs solely to the prosecutor. In
jurisdictions with prosecutorial waiver (also known as "direct
file"), the youth offender is subject to the concurrentjurisdiction
of the adult criminal court and the juvenile court; it is up to the
prosecutor to use his discretion to decide which court to file the
charges in.85
Commentators seem to be most troubled by this form of
waiver because it is "'fraught with the dangers of arbitrari-
ness. '"86 The prosecutor can be said to make the waiver decision
"outside of the adversarial process, in the privacy of her office,
restricted only by the most basic principles of professional ethics
and the requirement of probable cause." 7 Most states also have
certain age and offense guidelines that prosecutors must abide
by, which are meant to limit completely arbitrary decisions.8 8
Because the decision is protected by the traditional notion of
82. Id.
83. Klein, supra note 2, at 397.
84. See generally id. (discussing the prosecutor's "substantial discretionary
role" with any transfer method).
85. Scott, supra note 7, at 737.
86. Klein, supra note 2, at 395 (quoting Wallace J. Mlyniec, Juvenile Delin-
quent or Adult Convict-The Prosecutor's Choice, 14 Am. CRIM. L. RE%. 29, 37
(1977)).
87. Sabo, supra note 11, at 2426-27.
88. See Klein, supra note 2, at 394 (discussing prosecutorial waiver as a
transfer method).
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prosecutorial discretion, it is not reviewable."s The fact that the
prosecutorial discretion insulates the prosecutor's decision by
not requiring a hearing to be held, a statement of reasons to be
given, or his decision to be appealable makes this method of
waiver highly suspect.
The policy behind prosecutorial waiver is that it is procedur-
ally quick and convenient, but it arguably combines the worst fea-
tures of judicial and automatic waiver. The method is subject to
arbitrariness and unpredictability, as is transfer by judicial discre-
tion. In addition, it provides no due process protection and gives
a juvenile no meaningful chance to protest his transfer by show-
ing he is amenable to rehabilitation, and it is tantamount to a
"blatant attempt to evade the force of the Kent decision."9 Like
legislative waiver, a prosecutor need not consider the best inter-
ests of the child in exercising his discretion."' Proponents argue
that it is quicker because it bypasses a transfer hearing and all the
individual determinations made by a juvenile court judge in
favor of a single opinion by the prosecutor. Some also are critical
of the prosecutor's ability, acting on his own, to make the deter-
mination based arguably on anything he wants to, even if there is
guidance in the state juvenile statutes. This method has made
gains in popularity because it satisfies the desires of the "get
tough" movement-it sends more kids to jail. It does so, how-
ever, at a steep price, both for the youths and for society.
In addition to the above-mentioned problems, prosecutorial
waiver is subject to several unique criticisms. First, some critics
argue that the waiver decision should not be included under the
power of prosecutorial discretion because that power covers only
choosing which charges to file, rather than selecting the forum
in which to file the charges. z The second problem is that the
prosecutor has a troubling conflict of interest because he repre-
sents the interests of the state, and justice cannot be served when
the prosecutor is serving the best interests of the state and the
best interests of the child at the same time.9" Unlike a neutral
judge, who tries to find a balance between public safety and the
best interests of the child, the prosecutor is a party to the action.
89. Prescott, supra note 8, at 1009.
90. United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wright,
3., dissenting).
91. Sabo, supra note 11, at 2441.
92. Id. at 2449-50 (arguing that there are two determinations in
prosecutorial waiver-which charge to file and which court to file it in-and
that only the first of these determinations is subject to the deference of
prosecutorial waiver as traditionally conceived).
93. Id. at 2451.
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It seems counter-intuitive that an advocate for one side can be an
advocate for the other side as well, so it is logical to conclude that
the prosecutor probably does not have the best interests of the
child in mind. The decision becomes more muddled when con-
sidering how much a prosecutor is influenced by public pressure,
especially if he is in an elected office. It is fair to say that most
commentators view prosecutorial waiver as the most dangerous
form of waiver because it is not designed to serve the best inter-
ests of the child and is subject to extreme arbitrariness, secrecy,
and deference. 4
III. JUDICIAL DISCRETION AS THE SUPERIOR WAIVER METHOD:
SERVING BOTH THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE
BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
Transfer for juveniles is warranted in two circumstances:
first, when the juvenile cannot be helped through the rehabilita-
tive efforts of the juvenile justice system; second, when the juve-
nile's offense was so heinous that the maximum punishment that
the juvenile court can impose falls far short of what is necessary.
Judicial waiver is the only transfer method that is able to fully and
fairly take into consideration the interests of society and the juve-
nile offender before taking this serious step. Transfer has serious
negative effects on society and the individual and should be used
only in the hardest cases. Automatic and prosecutorial transfers
are "quick-fixes" designed to appease a panicked public; they
send too many young people who are good candidates for reha-
bilitation into the criminal justice system. Thus, the use of judi-
cial discretion must be the sole method of waiver. This section
seeks to explore the negative effects of transfer on the individual
juvenile and society at large, in an attempt to show why it is so
crucial to only waive juvenile offenders who are truly lost causes.
A. Effects of Transfer on the Juvenile
In all cases except those involving older, repeat, violentjuve-
nile offenders, transfer fails to serve the goals of deterrence and
selective incapacitation. One of the main purposes of waiver is to
allow criminal courts to punish violent youths who cannot be
dealt with in juvenile courts because their crimes call for a sen-
tence which is more serious than the juvenile court has the
power to impose. Research indicates that violent juveniles are
94. See generally Klein, supra note 2, at 394-97; Sabo, supra note 11, at
2439-51; Slaten, supra note 78, at 836-52. But see Scott, supra note 7, at 738
(arguing that prosecutorial waiver is superior to legislative waiver because it
involves some individual discretion, as does judicial waiver).
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treated more leniently in criminal court than they would have
been in juvenile court." This is likely because judges who are
used to seeing the records of hardened adult criminals will view
juveniles as less harmful compared to the adults they usually see.
In addition, some judges may be reluctant to send juveniles to
adult prisons because they are afraid of what will probably hap-
pen to them there.96
Perhaps the most disturbing result of transfer is that
juveniles may be locked up in adult prison facilities. Studies on
juveniles in the adult prison population are so appalling that they
shock the conscience. These studies have shown that children
locked up in adult prisons are eight times more likely to commit
suicide (most within the first twenty-four hours of incarceration),
five times more likely to be sexually assaulted, and twice as likely
to be assaulted by prison staff than youth offenders housed in
juvenile facilities.97 Even if a youth has committed a terrible
crime, incarceration under these circumstances amounts to noth-
ing less than cruel and unusual punishment. What about the kids
who were transferred for non-violent property or drug offenses
because of overbroad automatic and prosecutorial waiver statutes
with no chance at appeal? Surely it is not fair to stick them in
adult prisons.
Not only do juveniles suffer victimization in adult jails after
they have been transferred and convicted in adult court, but they
also lose access to all of the services and treatment available in
the juvenile justice system.98 In juvenile facilities, the entire focus
is on rehabilitation and treatment, and this typically includes
counseling, academic services, and job training, among many
other programs. In adult prisons, studies have shown that staff
are "consistently less helpful and more punitive,"9 9 as one might
expect from a staff which is conditioned to respond to adult
criminals in a purely punitive environment.
Another significant result of transfer is that juvenile offend-
ers are stigmatized as criminals. Unlike juvenile court adjudica-
95. See Klein, supra note 2, at 402 (reviewing the consequences of transfer
and contending that it is usually a "losing proposition").
96. Id.
97. Brent Pollitt, Buying Justice on Credit Instead of Investing in Long-Term
Solutions, 6J.L. & FAM. STUD. 281, 291 (2004).
98. See Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juvenile
Offenders, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'v 323, 353 (1991).
99. E.g., id. (reporting that adult prison staff provided inadequate assis-
tance to youths in "helping them to control their violent behavior, . . achieve
personal goals, and prepare them with job skills for their return to the commu-
nity," as well as encouraging program participation, providing counseling, and
securing other necessary services).
2008]
212 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 22
tion, where records are kept private with the goal of treating a
young offender and then releasing him with a clean slate to start
his life as an adult, juveniles transferred to criminal court will
have the burden of carrying that stigma with them for the rest of
their lives. 0 In addition to hurting their future career and social
prospects, the attachment of this stigma at a young age can affect
ajuvenile's psyche; if he is labeled a criminal when he is fifteen,
he will believe he is one and will act accordingly.01 In sum, the
effects of injecting young people into the criminal justice system
seem to foreclose any chance that the juvenile might have of
turning his life around and becoming a responsible and law-abid-
ing adult in the future.
B. Effects of Transfer on Society
The negative effects of "quick-fix" solutions, like over-inclu-
sive waiver statutes, eventually trickle down to harm society.
Juveniles who have been transferred into the criminal system
have higher rates of recidivism, are rearrested more quickly, and
commit more serious crimes once they are released than do
those adjudicated in the juvenile courts. 10 2 The system's failure
for juveniles translates to a failure for society when non-rehabili-
tated former juvenile offenders are eventually released from
prison and re-offend. Society cannot both lock up thousands of
youths with adult criminals and not expect crime rates to
increase as waves of these now-adult, non-rehabilitated offenders
get back on the street. Studies show that they will resume their
criminal behavior, and this time the stakes will be higher because
it is an adult committing the crime. 10 3 One commentator has
summed up the result of these reactionary waiver schemes as buy-
ing justice on credit: "Removal of the juvenile from society with-
out rehabilitation only postpones the debt, with exorbitant
interest due when the non-rehabilitated juvenile inevitably
returns to society and recidivates."' °4
It might be harder in the short run and politically unpopu-
lar, but the best way to promote public safety is to focus on reha-
bilitation and prevention at a young age instead of locking
troubled youths up and forgetting about them until they are out
on the streets again as adults with an incomplete education, no
job skills, no behavioral counseling, and the stigma of being a
100. See Angell, supra note 53, at 142.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 140.
103. See, e.g., id. at 140-41.
104. Pollitt, supra note 97, at 286.
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criminal. The effects of transfer are so unattractive and unprom-
ising that it seems obvious that the option must be used only for
juveniles who cannot be dealt with in the juvenile justice system.
Moreover, judicial waiver is the method that is least likely to
result in the waiver ofjuvenile offenders who could be helped by
the rehabilitative aims of the juvenile system. The most serious
offenders to whom the strict waiver laws are meant to apply will
most likely be waived by the juvenile court anyway. ' 0 5 There is no
reason for states to continue to use automatic and prosecutorial
waiver when their policy aims have failed and when there exist
better and fairer ways to transfer the most serious offenders with-
out sweeping in juvenile delinquents who are amenable to
rehabilitation.
IV. LEGAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DIFFERENCES IN CHILDREN: THE
NEED FOR A SEPARATE COURT SYSTEM WITH DISTINCT
APPROACHES TO TREATMENT
AND CULPABILITY
Children are capable of committing the same crimes as
adults, and often do. For the "get tough" crowd, this means that
children who commit the same offenses as adults should face the
same punishment as adults. This position ignores one indisputa-
ble fact: children are developmentally and cognitively different
than adults. Children do not have fully-developed senses of
morality, decision-making skills, or resistance to a number of
outside sources. These factors are reflected in the American legal
system, where children are presumptively treated as less culpable
than adults who commit the same crimes.
A. Developmental and Cognitive Differences in Children
Children are fundamentally distinct from adults in critical
ways that make them objectively different from adults in terms of
culpability. According to one commentator, the increase in
waiver laws reflects the idea that lawmakers have largely ignored
adolescence-the period between childhood, when there is a
presumption of no culpability, and adulthood, where there is full
culpability.0 6 There is no space in the continuum for young peo-
ple who are almost adults but who have not developed proper
decision-making abilities yet. °7
105. See Rose, supra note 71, at 988.
106. C. Antoinette Clarke, The Baby and the Bathwater: Adolescent Offending
and Punitive Juvenile Justice Reform, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. 659, 691-92 (2005).
107. Id.
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Law professor C. Antoinette Clarke has succinctly outlined a
series of developmental factors that inherently limit how much
blame can be placed on a child for his criminal actions.'0 8 First,
adolescents lack the reasoning, rationality, and maturity of judg-
ment of the average adult. Second, the quest for personal iden-
tity often leads juveniles to participate in varying degrees of risky
behavior, such as alcohol or drug use, sexual experimentation, or
delinquent behavior, reflecting the rebellion that is normal when
shifting focus from parents to peer groups. Third, children are
more likely to give in to peer pressure than adults are, meaning
that they are far more likely to engage in risky behavior if they
associate with friends who conduct themselves in that manner.
Fourth, younger people tend to be less future-orientated and
weigh the short-term consequences of their conduct more than
the long-term consequences. Fifth, adolescents take more health
and safety risks than adults do. And sixth, teenagers tend to be
more impulsive in their actions than adults, meaning that they
do not think about their conduct beforehand. Because the juve-
nile brain has not reached its full stage of development, many of
these behavioral factors will abate as the child grows older and
gains more experience and maturity.'0 9 Therefore, since
juveniles' brains and behavioral patterns are not fully developed,
it is unfair to hold them to the same standard as fully mature
adults. The problem only becomes exacerbated when children
are locked up for an inordinate amount of time because of risky
behavior that is likely only temporary.
Juvenile offenders are held to a higher behavioral standard
than their adult criminal counterparts if they are subject to adult
punishments without all of the constitutional protections and
freedoms that adults have. In addition, the juvenile offender is
"held to a standard of maturity and responsibility higher than
that applied to her noncriminal youth counterparts" because her
punishment is more severe." 0 Juvenile offenders truly get the
worst of both worlds in waiver, as they are denied the benefit of
the doubt to which their age entitles them while receiving none
of the "benefits and freedoms of adulthood" that adult offenders
are entitled to. a l ' Because of the inherent difference in the abil-
108. Id. at 694-704.
109. Id. at 710.
110. Forst & Blomquist, supra note 98, at 374.
111. See id. at 373 ("[Y]outhful offenders are being asked to bear the lia-
bilities of the two worlds between which they stand-childhood with its attend-
ant dependencies and immature judgment but without its protections and
nurturance-and adulthood with its attendant obligations and responsibilities,
but without its freedoms and independence.").
214
JUDICIAL WAIVER AS THE ONLY EQUITABLE METHOD
ity to make good decisions, as well as all the other factors dis-
cussed above, it is simply not fair to hold a juvenile to the same
standard when he has less capacity to see the long-term conse-
quences of his actions, is more likely to give in to peer pressure,
and has not yet fully developed his decision-making abilities.
With stricter measures and little chance for rehabilitation, the
criminal youth class in America will only increase.' 12 Instead, an
effort must be made to allow and help at-risk juvenile offenders
mature out of their destructive habits.
Another factor that affects juvenile risky behavior is the
social context of which they are a part. As Clarke notes about
gang-infested neighborhoods:
[T] he assignment of status to young males based on tough-
ness and fighting skills is an enduring theme of gang life.
Social identity and respect are the most important features
of the street code. Within this context, there are clear-cut
rules for using violence to gain respect. The public nature
of a person's image or status identity often requires open
displays of "nerve," including attacks on others, getting
revenge for previous situations with an opponent, and the
protection of members of the group.' 13
The social context of ajuvenile's conduct is closely related to the
influence that his peers exert over him. While it is obvious that
grouping juveniles into one large group for purposes of cognitive
development is misleading (because everyone develops morality
and maturity at different paces), studies have shown that kids in
less educated and poorer communities, where violence and
gangs are more likely to be a problem, develop these characteris-
tics at a slower pace. 1 4 This creates a disturbing situation when
coupled with the fact that transfer provisions disproportionately
impact minority juveniles, especially black males. If juveniles in
high-risk neighborhoods develop morality and good decision-
making skills slower than the average youth due to their unfavor-
112. See Angell, supra note 53, at 139-43.
113. Clarke, supra note 106, at 704-06.
114. See Klein, supra note 2, at 407-08 (discussing Lawrence Kohlberg's
theory of moral development). In his study, Kohlberg divided a person's moral
development into three levels and six stages. He found that most juveniles and
the majority of adults operate at his stage four, "law and order" level, where
.support for the existing social order is a primary value." Id. Significantly,
Kohlberg's study revealed that juveniles from low-income and low-education
communities often develop moral judgment at a slower place, sometimes oper-
ating at his stage three, "peer approval seeking" level, or even his stage two, "If
I'm not getting nothing, I'm not giving nothing" mindset. Id.
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able social environments,115 and if these youths are being denied
opportunities at rehabilitation through disproportionate subjec-
tion to waiver, a cycle of incarceration is created from which
these neighborhoods are unable to recover. Essentially, the con-
temporary trend towards waiver and harsher punishment in the
justice system sacrifices long-term goals and progress with short-
sighted "get tough" schemes designed to satisfy a frightened pub-
lic and increase approval ratings for legislators.
Statistics indicate that most adult crimes are committed for
financial reasons, whereas mostjuvenile crimes are committed as
a result of emotional damage, peer pressure, or poor decision
making due to youthful impulsiveness.' 16 The divergence in
motivation for criminal acts between adults and adolescents fur-
ther backs up the need for corresponding different treatment.
The deficiencies that motivate juvenile crime are usually things
that are temporary and treatable. The intervention should be
seen as a chance to rehabilitate troubled youths so that they are
less likely to re-offend in the future, rather than to lock them up
and subject them to the horrors of adult prisons, where their
chances of a successful post-incarceration life decrease
exponentially.
B. Judicial Acknowledgements of the Legal Differences
Between Adults and Juveniles
Although the state legislatures seem to ignore the differ-
ences between juvenile and adult offenders in an effort to "get
tough" on crime, the judicial branch has long recognized that
children and adults are to be viewed separately before the law.
Thompson v. Oklahoma, a 1988 United States Supreme Court case,
involved a juvenile who had participated in a murder at age fif-
teen and had been sentenced to death in an Oklahoma trial
court.11 7 Writing for the plurality, Justice Stevens asserted that
"[t]he road we have traveled during the past four decades ...
leads to the unambiguous conclusion that the imposition of the
death penalty on a 15-year-old offender is now generally abhor-
rent to the conscience of the community," and vacated the capi-
tal sentence."18 In deciding that the death penalty for those
under age sixteen at the time of the crime was a violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court looked at the
prevailing opinions of professional organizations like the Ameri-
115. Id. at 407.
116. See Rose, supra note 71, at 986.
117. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion).
118. Id. at 832.
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can Bar Association, at international law, and at the fact that
juries rarely recommended the death penalty for offenders
under the age of sixteen where it was legal to do so. 19 The plu-
rality reiterated that they had "already endorsed the proposition
that less culpability should attach to a crime committed by ajuve-
nile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult" and that
"the basis for this conclusion is too obvious to require extended
explanation."12 0 It speaks volumes that the Supreme Court con-
sidered the issue too obvious to even bother addressing it in
detail when deciding one of the first cases that began to scale
back the scope of the death penalty after the moratorium on the
death penalty was ended. 1
2 1
Although the Court had determined that capital punish-
ment was cruel and unusual for juvenile offenders less than six-
teen years of age, it upheld the death penalty for juveniles who
were above the age of sixteen in Stanford v. Kentucky.1 22 However,
in 2002 the Court held in Atkins v. Virginia that the imposition of
the death penalty on mentally handicapped individuals was cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment.1 23 This decision seemingly opened the door for the Court
to reexamine its position in Stanford, which it did three years later
in Roper v. Simmons. 124 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy
echoed the considerations from Thompson: "Once the diminished
culpability of juveniles is recognized, it is evident that the peno-
logical justifications for the death penalty apply to them with
lesser force than to adults."1 25 The majority cited three reasons
for this lessened culpability of juveniles: their "lack of maturity
and underdeveloped sense of responsibility," the fact that
'juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influ-
ences and outside pressures, including peer pressure," and the
fact that "the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that
of an adult.' 26 Admitting that juveniles are indeed capable of
119. Id. at 830-32.
120. Id. at 835.
121. The Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
239-40 (1972) (per curium), created a de facto moratorium on the use of capi-
tal punishment in the United States. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07
(1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, I].), the Court held that the
death penalty is not an automatic violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments as long as certain procedural safeguards are met, effectively end-
ing the moratorium on the imposition of the death penalty.
122. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
123. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
124. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 556 (2005).
125. Id. at 571.
126. Id. at 569-70.
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committing crimes that are heinous and wanton, the majority
nevertheless insisted that "the differences between juvenile and
adult offenders are too marked and well understood to risk
allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite
insufficient culpability."1 27
The categorical bar on capital punishment for offenders
under the age of eighteen represents a big step towards changing
how people view the system. The Court's ruling reinforced that,
aside from societal standards, it is cruel and unusual punishment
to execute children because they are not given the chance to be
rehabilitated and to mature out of their reckless behavior. 128 To
be sure, some juveniles who commit crimes that would merit con-
sideration of the death penalty as adults are not amenable to any
sort of treatment and will be a danger to society for the rest of
their lives. But the majority of risky behavior in youths is caused
or exacerbated by the immaturity of children, which fades away
with age.' 21 Even in the face of a terrible crime, it does not seem
humane to force a juvenile to forfeit the rest of his life for what
could possibly be a youthful mistake. The serious juvenile offend-
ers who were spared by this decision are the ones at whom waiver
should be targeted; if the circumstances dictate removal to crimi-
nal court, then a violent offender should be sentenced as an
adult. But the ban on the death penalty at least gives him a
chance to turn his life around. Even juvenile offenders who com-
mit serious violent crimes that previously would have made them
eligible for the death penalty deserve to be treated differently
than adult offenders. Harsher sentences may be in order, but it is
still vital to give them a chance to redeem themselves by giving
them access to rehabilitation, counseling, and educational
resources while in adult prison.
The decision in Roper acknowledges that the proper thing to
do is to err on the side of juvenile offenders, and to reject an
overbroad "get tough" regimen. This rationale is equally applica-
ble to other severe forms of punishment for juveniles, such as a
life sentence without the possibility of parole. Although it does
not deprive the offender of life in the literal sense, it forecloses
any chance of making a positive impact on society following suc-
cessful rehabilitation. As Ellen Marrus and Irene Merker Rosen-
berg argue, "[i]f the child's brain is still growing until either
twenty or twenty-five.... subjecting a child to adult punishment,
127. Id. at 572-73.
128. Id. at 569-70.
129. Id. at 570.
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especially life without the possibility of parole, is irrational."' 30
The same logic can be implied from Roper because children are
less culpable than adults, and less able to make good decisions, it
is much harder to predict what kind of person they will be in five
or ten years, whereas one can predict with reasonable certainty
the future of a person who has been repeatedly arrested as an
adult. Without giving juvenile offenders a way out, there is no
incentive for them to grow up, mature, and change their ways.
Roper v. Simmons was a significant step forward, but the Court
must go further in restricting life without the possibility of parole
forjuveniles, or else it risks "the virtual destruction of young peo-
ple who might benefit society and live productive lives."'' Know-
ing that children are inherently less culpable than adults, it is a
mistake to take away any chance for them to reform while they
are still young enough to have a reasonable chance of success
later in life.
V. How TO IMPROVE JUDICAL WAIVER
The waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction to allow some
youths to be tried as adults is a necessary evil in our legal system.
Clearly, the conduct of some youths calls for punishment in the
criminal system. In order to function best for society and for juve-
nile offenders, waiver must be used only on the worst youth
offenders, and the rest must be treated by an effective and effi-
cient juvenile system. As discussed above, judicial waiver is the
only one of the three popular methods of waiver which offers
some semblance of what the juvenile justice system should be-a
system to help youths mature and grow out of their delinquency
phase through treatment, not punishment. There are several
ways to improve judicial waiver to ensure that only the lost causes
are sent into the adult criminal system, and only in the harshest
of circumstances.
The most essential thing to allow for fair and effective discre-
tionary waiver is to have judges who specialize in juvenile law
cases. A juvenile court judge should be "extensively trained and
educated on juvenile delinquency and the standards for deter-
mining when to waive juvenile court jurisdiction." '1 3 2 In addition,
one scholar suggests that state legislatures need to conduct
research through the state juvenile justice system to determine
more objective standards that juvenile court judges could use as
130. Marrus & Rosenberg, supra note 75, at 1180.
131. Id. at 1182.
132. Scott, supra note 7, at 746.
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guidelines in evaluating youth offenders.'33 With objective stan-
dards to guide the expert judges and their subjective opinions,
the system should run smoother and be both more consistent
and predictable, satisfying "get tough" proponents. While the
expertise of the judge would help him in evaluating individual
youths, the objective standards suggested by the legislatures in
their judicial waiver statutes will help to assure that results are
not totally inconsistent or discriminatory.
In terms of training, judges must have knowledge regarding
the "operative psycho-social, contextual, and biological influ-
ences on a 'person-in-progress'"; only with this sort of expertise
will judges have the "necessary tools to properly evaluate a juve-
nile's past or future choices."134 If the system is to function for
the benefit of children, the judges must be involved in and have
experience with juvenile law cases. Without automatic waivers,
each child will get an individual determination that will hopefully
result in the receipt of treatment or rehabilitation that is likely to
help him mature and become a productive member of society. If
the juvenile justice system is going to be effective in transferring
only the most hopelessly lost youth offenders to the adult system
while finding suitable rehabilitation options for the rest, it is
essential to have well-trained judges who will look beyond the
youth's offense to determine how to get him back on track.
One way to satisfy "get tough" advocates in the absence of
automatic waiver statutes is through the use of presumptive
waiver. For certain types of offenders who commit certain crimes,
presumptive waiver statutes shift the burden of proof onto the
child to prove he is amenable to treatment.3 5 This method cre-
ates a hybrid of legislative and judicial waiver.' 36 It is a way of fast-
tracking the cases that are likely appropriate for waiver while still
allowing juvenile offenders to receive individual determinations
from qualified juvenile judges. Critics have raised the concern
that presumptive waiver has many of the faults of automatic
waiver; for example, after California passed a presumptive waiver
statute, Los Angeles saw increases of 318% in waiver hearings and
a 234% increase in actual waivers. 137 One way to correct this
overuse of presumptive waiver is to restrict its application to a
very limited class of juvenile offenders, perhaps only those with a
certain number of convictions and who have committed a serious
violent crime that is objectively likely to warrant transfer. Addi-
133. Id.
134. Clarke, supra note 106, at 715.
135. Klein, supra note 2, at 387.
136. Rose, supra note 71, at 983.
137. Klein, supra note 2, at 387.
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tionally, the burden of proof that shifts to the juvenile to show
that he is amenable to treatment could be relatively low. As
always, the ultimate decision must be made by the judge.
Although there would be a presumption towards waiver in pre-
scribed cases, the final decision would have to be based on the
judge's evaluation of the child and the likelihood that he is ame-
nable to some sort of treatment.
Another alternative is the imposition of blended sentences
by juvenile court judges. A blended sentence allows a judge to
"impose sentences consisting of detention at a state youth facility
until the juvenile reaches age twenty-one, combined with a sus-
pended adult prison sentence to be served if the juvenile re-
offends, has not been rehabilitated, or does not comply with the
conditions of the juvenile sentence." 3 Blended sentences pro-
vide a type of insurance policy for the juvenile offender and soci-
ety-he is given access to the juvenile system, but if he fails to
cooperate, he is then sent to adult prison. Blended sentences
should only be handed out in severe cases, where the crime is
especially heinous or the youth has a long record, but where
there is also a chance of amenability. The danger of imposing
blended sentences in less serious cases is that a juvenile who
would not ordinarily be sent to adult prison may wind up there
on a technicality or because of a small mistake. Blended
sentences are an effective way to give a juvenile an incentive to
stay out of trouble and to rehabilitate himself, while still provid-
ing an insurance option to the state if he proves he is not amena-
ble to treatment in the long run.
One final option for the improvement ofjudicial waiver is to
allow for juvenile courts to statutorily retain their juvenile juris-
diction past the age of eighteen. This allows the juvenile system
to continue to provide its benefit, even when the former juvenile
is technically no longer a juvenile within its jurisdiction. By pro-
viding "a rehabilitative sentence for a retributive amount of
time,"1 39 this method allows juvenile courts to use rehabilitative
treatments even into the early adult years, when such treatment
will be useful for the offender while maintaining retributive aims.
This alternative to traditional waiver is meant for older, non-vio-
lent juvenile offenders and is meant to provide them time to
mature before subjecting them to the harsh world of adult
prison. 40 Like a blended sentence, it offers the juvenile an
incentive to straighten up and fly right or else risk incarceration
138. Clarke, supra note 106, at 681-82.
139. Prescott, supra note 8, at 1015.
140. Id. at 1011.
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in an adult prison. As discussed above, juveniles' behaviors and
cognitive functions develop at different paces, and this method
allows extra time for slow learners to mature."' Critics of the
retention of juvenile jurisdiction argue that it offers a contradic-
tory signal to participants, as it sends both rehabilitative and
retributive messages.1 4 2 Some argue that if the former juvenile is
allowed to continue rehabilitation meant for minors, he will not
learn his lesson and will fail to appreciate the seriousness of the
conduct that landed him in the program.14
All the methods described above are ways in which states can
tweak judicial waiver to meet the perceived needs-and often
demands-of their citizens. This Note argues thatjudicial waiver
is the only method of transfer that can serve the original pur-
poses of the juvenile justice system. That being said, there is not
just one type of judicial waiver. The precise method that each
state uses must be tailored to its own needs and enshrined in a
comprehensive statute outlining its goals and aims. It is possible
to have both lenient and harsh judicial waiver statutes. It is essen-
tial, though, for every system to provide individualized evalua-
tions of juvenile offenders by experienced juvenile judges and
the chance for meaningful appeal of transfer through reverse
waiver. Likewise, each system should be designed to attempt to
rehabilitate youth, not to give up on them at the first sign ofjuve-
nile delinquency and ship them off to the adult criminal system
where their chances of rehabilitation decrease exponentially.
CONCLUSION
Juvenile crime is a problem in this country, as it is in most
places. The worst possible reaction to juvenile crime is to think of
the juvenile offender in the same way as an adult criminal.
Youths are developmentally different from adults in a number of
critical ways which in turn affects how accountable they should
be held for their actions. Sending record numbers of juvenile
offenders to adult prisons may seem like a way to make society
safer, but that strategy is short-sighted and ends up making soci-
ety less safe when the juvenile is released from prison as a hard-
ened criminal and is more likely to become a repeat offender.
The focus of the juvenile justice system must be refocused on the
values its proponents preached during its early days. The system
141. See generally Clarke, supra note 106, at 721 (commenting on the
developmental immaturity of juveniles and the dangers of subjecting a juvenile
offender to trial in a juvenile court under extended juvenile jurisdiction).
142. Id. at 720-21.
143. See, e.g., id.
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must be set up to help children, not punish them, and to help
turn troubled teenagers into productive adults. In accordance
with this philosophy, waiver ofjuvenile court jurisdiction must be
reserved for cases where there is no chance for rehabilitation-
only the most serious cases. And even in these cases, a juvenile
still deserves an individual determination by a qualified juvenile
court judge after the judge has looked at his unique situation.
Automatic and prosecutorial waivers only make the problem
worse by being so over-inclusive as to sweep into the criminal sys-
tem juveniles who are perfectly amenable to rehabilitation but
never get the chance to mature out of their troubled youth years.
Judicial discretionary waiver is the only method of waiver that can
serve both short-term and long-term goals for individual juveniles
and society. For a juvenile offender, individual determinations
give him a chance to show that he is amenable to treatment and
that he wants to improve his behavior. For society, rehabilitating
youths-despite the cost, resources, and time involved in the
treatment process-can create a generation of mature adults
who have learned from their mistakes rather than a class of con-
victed criminals who enter adult prisons as children and leave
with little chance to rebound from their troubled childhoods.
Judicial waiver, although in need of improvement, is the only way
of dealing with the small portion of the juvenile offender popula-
tion that is not amendable to treatment while simultaneously
embracing the philosophy of the original juvenile system for
troubled youths who just need a little help getting through the
teenage years to reach responsible adulthood. Embracing the
child-first philosophy through the elimination of automatic
waiver and the adoption of an improved version ofjudicial waiver
is the best and only way to create a system that works in the best
interests of both juveniles and society.
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